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Brian W. Semkow*
Emergence of Derivative Financial
Products Markets in Japan
Introduction
The evolution of derivative financial products I in Japan received a sig-
nificant fillip on September 3, 1988, when the Tokyo Stock Exchange
("TSE") and the Osaka Securities Exchange ("OSE") launched stock
index futures trading. The Japanese Parliament, the Diet, made the
development possible when it amended its Securities and Exchange
Law2 on May 25, 1988. 3 This statutory amendment evinces a significant
turning point in Japanese attitudes towards markets in derivative finan-
cial products. Japanese leaders traditionally have regarded these mar-
kets as risky and overly speculative.4 Nevertheless, since 1985 the
Ministry of Finance ("MoF") has embarked on an ambitious course of
reducing restrictions which have hindered the development ofJapanese
derivative financial markets. Once the MoF completes this liberalization
process, Japanese money managers will have the same opportunities to
* Ph.D. (Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1982); L.L.B.
(University of Toronto Law School, 1983); Member of the Bar of British Columbia,
Canada.
1. Derivative financial products consist of futures and options contracts on
stocks, bonds, stock indexes, interest rates and currencies, as contrasted with direct
investment in the underlying stocks, bonds and other financial markets and
instruments.
2. Shoken-Torihiki-Ho (Securities and Exchange Law), Law No. 25 of 1948
[hereinafter SELl.
3. Shoken-Torihiki-ho no Ichibu o Kasei Suru Horitsu (the 1988 Amendment to
the Securities and Exchange Law) No. 75 of 1988 [hereinafter Amended SEL]. See
infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
4. Japan had one of the world's first organized futures exchanges, the
choaimaikaisho, a rice commodity futures exchange, established in Osaka in 1730.
On this exchange, rice farmers used futures contracts settled in cash, not rice, to
hedge market risk associated with crop yield uncertainty. See Arimura, From Rice to
Equities, A New Era in Japan's Futures Markets, Japan Econ.J., Sept. 10, 1988, at 13, col.
1. Japan also had financial futures before World War II but market crashes led Japa-
nese regulators to distrust and, eventually, to prohibit the speculative aspect of
futures trading. See Made in Singapore, Destined for Tokyo, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 1986, at
74. A number of futures scandals, involving settlement in cash, led to the demise of
cash-delivered futures contracts. See Financial Futures in Japan: Taking Stock, ECONO-
MiST, Feb. 21, 1987, at 84.
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hedge against investment losses, make speculative profits, and arbitrage
price discrepancies between underlying instruments and derivative
financial markets as their counterparts enjoy elsewhere, especially in the
United States.5
This Article will assess the recent emergence of derivative financial
products markets in Japan, as well as related deregulation of Japanese
investment in overseas derivative financial markets and the introduction
of officially sanctioned derivative Japanese financial products by private
firms in various foreign financial markets. In addition, this Article will
discuss recent developments in international finance that highlight the
increasing globalization of markets in both underlying cash financial
products and derivative financial products.
I. Evolution of Japanese Involvement in Derivative Financial
Products Markets
Beginning in 1985 with the introduction of futures trading in Japanese
government bonds,6 the MoF has allowed the TSE, the OSE, and the
domestic banking and securities industries to establish a variety of deriv-
ative financial products markets in Japan and to participate in similar
markets overseas. Increased access for Japanese investors to derivative
markets has involved three distinct aspects. One, the MoF liberalized
regulations that had prevented Japanese investors from investing in
derivative financial products listed on foreign exchanges. 7 Two, the
MoF authorized the creation of a panoply of domestic derivative finan-
cial products markets.8 Three, the MoF allowed certain firms to offer a
limited number of derivative instruments based on Japanese financial
instruments on overseas markets. 9
A. Liberalization of Restrictions on Japanese Investment in Overseas
Derivative Financial Products
In May, 1987, the MoF permitted Japanese financial institutions and
institutional investors10 to trade directly for their own accounts in a vari-
5. Derivative financial products markets elsewhere are also relatively new. For
example, U.S. money managers began trading currency futures on the International
Monetary Market of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") in 1972. Options
trading on the securities exchanges began in 1973, as did stock index futures, when
in that year the Chicago Board Options Exchange ("CBOE") began trading on its
Standard & Poor's ("S&P") 100 index. Bond futures trading began in 1975 with
trading on futures in Government National Mortgage Association certificates
(GNMAs or, more popularly, "Ginnie Maes"). See B. LoNGsTRETH, MODERN MANAGE-
MENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 61-66 and 133-36 (1986).
6. See infra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 23-87 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
10. The regulation applied to foreign exchange banks, designated securities
firms, insurance companies and investment trust firms. See Overseas Futures Trading
Available tojapanfrom May: MoF, Japan Econ.J., May 2, 1987, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter
Futures Trading Available].
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ety of derivative financial products listed on foreign exchanges. I I These
regulations gave domestic Japanese investors access to futures markets
in currencies, stock indexes, interest rates, and bonds, as well as options
on these futures contracts. 12 Subsequently, the MoF revised these regu-
lations further to allow eligible firms to engage in options trading on
non-futures related instruments, such as U.S. treasury bonds and inter-
est rates on overseas exchanges.' 3
Three principal reasons underlie this governmental policy of liber-
alization. First, and most important, providing access to foreign deriva-
tive financial products allowed large Japanese investors to hedge against
the risk of losses caused by foreign exchange and interest rate fluctua-
tions pertaining to their ever growing foreign currency assets.14
Second, the MoF had been pressured by domestic financial institu-
tions and foreign governments, particularly the United States govern-
ment, to lift the prohibition against investing in foreign futures
markets.' 5 For the United States government, such pressure was not
without self-interest. Lifting the ban would provide greater liquidity to
the huge American Treasury bond and stock index futures markets 16
and their underlying cash markets. Given the significant amount ofJap-
anese capital already invested in the United States,' 7 especially in U.S.
government bonds, providing Japanese institutional investors with the
means to hedge against currency and interest rate volatility will make
U.S. financial investments more attractive.' 8
11. Id.
12. Until this liberalization, the MoF officially authorized only overseas branches
and subsidiaries ofJapanese financial institutions to trade in foreign futures markets.
See Shibata & Nicoll, Tokyo Go-Ahead for Financial Futures, Financial Times, Apr. 23,
1987, at 21, col. 3. However, these foreign based subsidiaries account for only a
small percentage of the volume in these markets. See Japan Authorizes Trading of Futures
on Financial Markets, Asian Wall St.J. Weekly, Apr. 27, 1987, at 22, col. 4 [hereinafter
Japan Authorizes]. Some have alleged that the MoF has ignored unofficial trading by
Japanese residents. See Shibata and Nicoll, supra.
13. Foreign Option Trade Rule Eased, Japan Econ.J., Feb. 13, 1988, at 13, col. 4.
14. See Japan Authorizes, supra note 12, at 22, col. 4.
15. McMurray, Japan May Let Its Firms Trade Directly in Financial Futures Markets in
the United States, Wall St.J., Mar. 30, 1987, at 3, col. 3 [hereinafter Trade Directly]. For
instance, Clayton Yeutter, former U.S. Trade Representative and former CME presi-
dent, and Treasury SecretaryJames Baker had pressured the Japanese government to
lift the restrictions as part of the U.S. government's campaign to have the Japanese
adopt a greater free trade policy. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. For example, Japanese brokerage firms bought more than one-third of
the U.S. treasury bonds and notes sold at several treasury auctions held in 1986 to
finance the federal deficit.
18. See id. In anticipation of the removal of these restrictions, several foreign
futures exchanges undertook measures to attractJapanese interest in their derivative
financial products. For instance, the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBT") opened an
evening trading session in treasury bond and note futures and options that will coin-
cide with the TSE's morning trade hours. See McMurray, Japan May Loosen Rules on
Trading in U.S. Futures Markets, Asian Wall St.J. Weekly, Apr. 6, 1987, at 23, col. 1. In
addition, the CME opened its own office in Tokyo in April 1987 to attractJapanese
institutions to its markets. See Trade Directly, supra note 15, at 3, col. 3. Also, the
Cornell International Law Journal
Third, the liberalization of trading by Japanese financial institutions
in overseas derivative financial product markets demonstrates a familiar
pattern whereby the MoF grants Japanese financial institutions greater
business powers abroad than at home as a prelude to the liberalization
of domestic markets. 19 Such a strategy allows the MoF to effect signifi-
cant liberalization in creating domestic derivative financial products
while avoiding the costly mistakes that might otherwise be committed.
The MoF did not completely deregulate overseas futures transac-
tions. Individuals and businesses not enumerated in the regulations
may not participate in these markets, either directly or indirectly, as
through financial institutions acting as brokers,20 essentially because the
MoF still regards futures trading as excessively speculative and risky. 2 1
Until the MoF settles the issue of investor protection, 2 2 it will not allow
substantial Japanese participation in the world's financial futures
markets.
B. Emergence of Derivative Financial Products Markets in Japan
1. Government Bond Futures
The MoF took the first step since the pre-1945 period toward the crea-
tion of derivative financial products markets in Japan with the October
1985 establishment of a futures market on the TSE for 10-yearJapanese
government bonds. 23 The MoF sought to provide Japanese institutional
investors with a means by which to hedge the value of their government
bonds portfolios against fluctuations caused by interest rate volatility. 24
London International Financial Futures Exchange ("LIFFE") increased its staffs in
Chicago and London to accommodate the growth of anticipated Japanese trading.
Id.
19. See A Future forJapanese Futures, ECONOMIST, May 9, 1987, at 73 [hereinafter A
Future].
20. Futures Trading Available, supra note 10, at 3, col. 1.
21. Id.
22. At the time of the MoF's liberalization, investigations were underway into sev-
eral cases of fraud involving transactions by the Japanese brokers on U.S. futures
exchanges. In one case, Asuka Co., a bankrupt futures brokerage in Tokyo, was
charged with defrauding 357 Japanese investors of YI.35 billion from October 1985
to January 1986 with transactions executed on the CME. See Schoenberger, Fear of
Fraud Makes Japan Authorities Go Slowly in Freeing Up Futures Trading, Asian Wall St. J.
Weekly, May 18, 1987, at 27, col. 1.
23. Korver, New Tokyo Bond Futures Market Survives Rough First Five Months, Japan
Econ.J., Mar. 8, 1986, at 19, col. 1. This was made possible when the Diet amended
its SEL on June 21, 1985. Shoken-Torihiki-ho no Ichibo o Kaisei suru Horitsu (The
1985 Amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law), Law No. 71 of 1985.
24. Government bond prices are inversely related to interest rates. If, for
instance, an investor anticipates a rise in interest rates and a fall in bond prices, he
can sell government bond futures, promising future delivery of bonds at a fixed
price. If the investor anticipates a fall in interest rates, and a rise in bond prices, he
can buy government bond futures, promising future acceptance of bonds at a fixed
price. Japanese interest rates suffered bouts of volatility during 1986 caused by inter-
est rate deregulation and monetary policy, namely, reduction of the government's
official discount rate. See Korver, supra note 23. For a more detailed discussion of
interest rate deregulation, see Semkow, The Deregulation of Japan's Financial Markets,
Vol 22
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Despite a fitful start,2 5 the bond futures market has become the world's
largest of its kind.26 By the end of 1986, the volume inJapanese 10-year
government bond futures exceeded that in U.S. government bond
futures on the CBT, the most active U.S. market. 2 7 The trading volume
of these bond futures in the fiscal year ending March 1988 was Y3,400
trillion (approximately $25 trillion).28
The TSE expanded further the government bond futures market on
July 8, 1988, with the introduction of trading in 20-year government
bond futures. 29 Observers expect this market to be smaller, at least ini-
tially, than the one for 10-year government bond futures. A chief reason
is the limited liquidity of the underlying cash market.3 0 Another reason
is that 20-year bonds suffer from wider price fluctuations than 10-year
bonds.3 1 This futures market will probably grow commensurate with
the underlying cash market's size and liquidity. The MoF plans to offer
Y2 trillion in 20-year bonds in fiscal 1988, and some private sources pro-
ject that annual issues of 20-year bonds will equal those of 10-year
bonds within five years.3 2
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1987, 34, 36; Semkow, The 1984 American/Japanese Financial
Agreement, 19 GEo. WASH.J. INV'L L. AND ECON., 741 763-67 (1985); Semkow,Japanese
Banking Law: Current Deregulation and Liberalization of Domestic and External Financial
Transactions, 17 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 81, 126-27, 140-43 (1985).
25. See Korver, supra note 23. Volatile interest rates early in 1986 caused bond
prices to fluctuate dramatically. Ironically, these fluctuations encouraged investors in
the bond futures market to speculate rather than hedge. See id. See also Tokyo Bond
Futures Market Begins to Play Intended Role, Japan Econ.J., Feb. 15, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
26. Tokyo Futures Market Leads World, Japan Econ. J., Jan. 17, 1987, at 24, col 1
[hereinafter Tokyo Leads World].
27. Id. In 1986, trading volume on the TSE Japanese government bond futures
market reached Y1,870 trillion, whereas trading volume of U.S. long-term govern-
ment bond futures on the CBT reached an estimated Y1,700 trillion. Id. The CBT
conducts approximately one-third of all trading in U.S. markets. Id. Trading in the
futures market was fueled by the growth of trading on the underlying cash market,
where total 1986 bond trading on the TSE and the over-the-counter market rose by
20 percent from 1985 to reach Y2,650 trillion. See Tokyo Leads World, supra note 26, at
4, col. 1.
The potential for foreign, especially American, participation in theJapanese bond
futures market is considerable. Despite a Japanese withholding tax on interest
earned on government bonds, U.S. insurance companies, pension funds and corpo-
rations diversifying their offshore holdings may purchase bond futures in order to
hedge their holdings ofJapanese government bonds. See Gallagher,Japan's Fledgling
Market for Government Bond Futures Grows Large and Lively, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly,
Nov. 3, 1986, at 28, col. 1.
28. Kamada, 20- Year Bond Futures Draw Light Initial Interest, Japan Econ. J., July 16,
1988, at 3, col. 2.
29. Id.
30. The Japanese government has only Y3.5 trillion in outstanding 20-year
bonds, only one-seventh of the outstanding balance of the 10-year bonds. Id. Fur-
thermore, a small group of brokers and investors holds the outstanding issues, con-
tributing to the cash market's illiquidity. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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2. Stock Futures Transactions
The MoF approved the introduction of the first stock futures trading
market in Japan by permitting the OSE to introduce the Osaka 50 Stock
Futures Contract ("OSF 50"), a basket of 50 TSE stocks.3 3 Japanese
institutional investors eagerly awaited the opening of the OSF 50 mar-
ket34 to have a cheaper and more convenient means of hedging against
price fluctuations in their stock portfolio, as well as an additional market
in which to make speculative or arbitrage profits. 35
The OSF 50 is structured like a stock index future 36 to comply with
33. Futures Trading in Osaka, Asian Wall St.J. Weekly, Apr. 27, 1987, at 22, col. 2.
The OSE had originally scheduled the OSF 50 to open on April 6, 1987, id., but it
was delayed for two months pending resolution of a debate in the Diet regarding tax
reform, specifically, a proposal to reduce the tax on a futures contract from 0.2% to
0.0125%. See Leung, Trading on Stock-Index Futures in Osaka Will Help Modernize Japanese
Markets, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, May 11, 1987, at 19, col. 1 [hereinafter Modernize
Japanese Markets].
34. According to one early 1987 survey by Nihon Keizai Shimbun Inc., which
solicited comments from 383 institutional investors, including banks and securities
houses, 94 percent expressed interest in futures trading, with 72 percent indicating
that they planned to engage in trading. See Institutional Investors Poised to Enter Nation's
1st Stock Futures Market, Japan Econ. J., Feb. 14, 1987, at 23, col. 1. Eighty-five per-
cent claimed they would use the OSF 50 as a hedge against stock price fluctuations.
Id. Among other motives for engaging in a futures market, 50 percent of the respon-
dents listed speculation and 42 percent arbitrage opportunities. Analysis of compar-
ative costs between stocks and stock futures bolsters the popularity of futures as a
method for hedging portfolio risks. Institutional and individual investors find futures
cheaper and more convenient to sell than shares. For example, in a billion yen trans-
action, a Japanese investor can reduce his commission and exchange tax costs by as
much as 83%. See Modernize Japanese Markets, supra note 33. As a result, investors can
manage and adjust equity holdings through futures trading alone.
35. Until recently, the potential for arbitraging price differences between the OSF
50 and the TSE cash market was limited. To take advantage of price anomalies
between the two markets, an arbitrageur must sell his large lots quickly. Unfortu-
nately, while the TSE had implemented computerized trading on at least some listed
shares, floor traders handled transactions for all but one of the OSF 50 shares, a
cumbersome and slow method. See Modernize Japanese Markets, supra note 33, at 19,
col. 3. In conjunction with the opening of the stock-index futures trading on the
OSE on September 3, 1988, the OSE decided to computerize trading in both the
OSF 50 and the Nikkei 225 on October 3, 1988. OSE to Begin Computer Futures Trading,
Japan Econ. J., Aug. 20, 1988, at 15, col. 3.
36. A stock index is the value of a weighted number of shares on a stock
exchange. Because the index has no connection with any physical entity, and is con-
nected only to the price of the underlying shares, physical delivery of share certifi-
cates is neither contemplated nor possible. A stock index future is an agreement to
pay or receive cash reflecting the difference between the price of the stock index at a
future time and the price of the stock index at the time of the original contract. One
can do this by paying an amount equal to the difference between the index of the
original contract conveyed, and that of the contract prevailing on the day it is repaid
or repurchased prior to the expiring of the contract (settlement of an open position
by a counter-trading). Alternatively, one can pay an amount equal to the difference
between the index of the original contract conveyed and that of the contract prevail-
ing on the last day of the contract (the final settlement method). As a result, stock
index future transactions are settled by cash payment or by receipt of the difference
between the price of the original contract and the price of the index at the time of
settlement. This may occur on the day the contract expires or earlier.
Vol. 22
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regulatory constraints while satisfying investor preferences. The OSF
50 principally includes the most representative of the 225 stocks under-
lying the TSE's Nikkei average 37 to allow for the diversified hedge
against price fluctuations that stock investors require. Nevertheless, it
contains sufficiently few stocks to permit the physical delivery of stocks
traded in the contract that the then-prevailing securities law required in
certain instances.38
The MoF cautiously limits the investors authorized to engage in
OSF 50 futures trading. For example, it set a high minimum contract
price of Y50 million. 39 In addition, it requires investors to deposit a
minimum of Y6 million in cash per contract, or nine percent of the
transaction value, whichever is higher, to start trading.40 The MoF also
restricts the scope of activities for which eligible investors could use the
OSF 50 by limiting trading to hedges against possible declines in the
value of their stock holdings.4 1
Despite a slow start,4 2 the OSF futures market grew quickly, aided
by the September 1987 reduction in the exchange tax from 0.2 percent
37. The OSF 50 comprises 50 stocks on the TSE that market analysts think best
reflect the Nikkei stock average, the most widely followed gauge ofJapan's stock mar-
kets. The underlying stocks of the OSF 50 account for 22 percent of the total market
capitalization of TSE's first section of stocks, and 30 percent of the average daily
turnover. See Leung, Opening Soon of Stock-Futures Market is Considered 'Turning Point,'
Wall St. J., May 11, 1987, at 33, col. 4.
The OSF 50 may also closely track the Nikkei 225 index, a relevant feature for
foreign fund managers, some of whom measure the performance of the funds they
manage against the Nikkei, and for investors using the OSF as a hedge against fluctu-
ations in their own, more broadly based stock holdings. According to a Nomura
Securities study, the shares of the OSF 50 have closely tracked those of the Nikkei
Stock Average over the past five years, rising 127%o and 143.5%, respectively. See
Modernize Japanese Markets, supra note 33, at 19, col. 3.
38. See SEL, supra note 2. The statute's prohibition of cash settlement was
designed to preclude stock index futures trading. The Diet removed this prohibition
in May 1988. See Amended SEL, supra note 3 and accompanying text. The OSF 50
has four settlement dates: the 15th of March, June, September and December. A
seller is required to make delivery of the underlying shares if on the last trading day
before the settlement day, the traders are unable to close their position. Traders can
close their positions by paying an amount equal to the difference between the price
of the original contract and that of the contract prevailing on the day it is repur-
chased or resold, a method which is called "settlement through a counter-trading."
See TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, OSAKA SECURITIES EXCHANGE, JAPAN SECURITIES DEAL-
ERS ASSOCIATION, STOCK INDEX FUTURES TRADING AND STOCK FUTURES TRADING-
THE TRADING MECHANISM AND FEATURES 8 (1988) [hereinafter SECURITIES BOOKLET].
Since most traders close their open positions prior to the settlement date, physical
delivery seldom occurs. See Modernize Japanese Markets, supra note 33, at 19, col. 3.
39. At Last, A Success Story, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1987, at 73 [hereinafter Success
Story].
40. See Modernize Japanese Markets, supra note 33, at 19, col. 3.
41. Osaka to Limit Individual Trading in Stock Futures, Japan Econ.J., Mar. 14, 1987,
at 20, col. 1.
42. For the first two months of the OSF 50's existence, trading volume averaged
fewer than 20 contracts per day. Success Story, supra note 39.
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to 0.0125 percent 43 and the global October market break in share
prices, which significantly increased interest in this contract as a risk-
hedging device.4 4 The viability of the OSF 50 futures market remains in
doubt, however, with the introduction of stock index futures trading on
the TSE and OSE on September 3, 1988. This article discusses the
ramifications of this development in the following section.4 5
3. Stock Index Futures
On September 3, 1988, both the TSE and the OSE launched a stock
index futures 46 market,4 7 pursuant to the Diet's May 1988 passage of
amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law.48 The TSE intro-
duced a stock index future based on its Tokyo Stock Price Index
("TOPIX"), an index of all 1,100 shares on the TSE's first section, which
is weighted toward larger companies. 49 The OSE introduced the better
43. Yukashoken-Torihiki-Zei Ho no Ichibu o Kasei suru Horitsu (1987 Amend-
ment to the Securities Exchange Tax Law), Law No. 96 of 1987. With this reduction
in the exchange tax on September 26, 1987, the cost of trading (tax plus commission
fee) was reduced by more than two-thirds. As a result, average daily trading volume
increased from 29 contracts to more than 1300 contracts. See Success Story, supra note
39.
44. On October 27 and 28. 1987, trading volume was 2740 and 4000 contracts
respectively. See id. By December, daily trading volume on the OSF 50 market often
surpassed Y200 million, an amount double the average turnover of cash stocks.
45. See infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
46. For an overview of stock index futures, see supra note 36.
47. The MoF had originally scheduled trading of stock index futures to begin in
July 1988. The MoF, however, concerned with tax reform measures, was unable to
formulate rules and guidelines needed to implement stock index futures trading. See
Slow Start of Stock Index Futures Trading, Japan Econ. J., June 25, 1988, at 19, col. 1.
48. See Amended SEL, supra note 3 and accompanying text. The development of
these markets had been envisaged for over a year, when the Securities and Exchange
Council Committee, an advisory body to the MoF, recommended in May 1987 that
stock-index futures and option trading begin. Subsequently, the Securities Bureau of
the MoF began preparing measures to implement the Committee's recommendation.
Securities Firms Fight Move to Open Futures Markets to Banks, Japan Econ. J., Nov. 28,
1987, at 3, col 1 [hereinafter Securities Firms Fight]. The TSE had even earlier investi-
gated the desirability of introducing stock price index futures. In January 1987, the
Security Policy Committee of the Exchange, an advisory body to the President of the
TSE, published a report which concluded that "[e]arly introduction of a stock index
futures contract, et at is necessary, and it is desirable to pave the way for such intro-
duction and also to start discussions for establishing a concrete framework for such
contract as soon as possible." See TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, OUTLINE OF TOKYO
STOCK PRICE INDEX FtrrRZS 1 (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter TOPIX OUTLINE]. The TSE
then created in March 1987 a Study Group on Futures Contracts under the aegis of
its Operations Committee. This study group drafted a framework governing the
trading of stock index futures on the TSE, which the Operations Committee and the
Board of Governors of the TSE approved in May and June, 1987, respectively. See id.
at 2.
49. Japan Markets Will.Add Stock Index Futures, L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 1988, pt. IV, at
4, col. 1 [hereinafter Markets Add Stock Index Futures].
The TSE market for domestic stocks is divided into two Sections. The First Sec-
tion is the marketplace for stocks of larger companies; the Second Section includes
smaller or newly-listed companies. The First Section encompasses nearly 1,100 com-
panies, compared to 430 companies in the Second Section. At the end of each busi-
ness year, the TSE reviews stocks traded in the Second Section issuing companies to
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known 225 share Nikkei Stock Average index future ("Nikkei 225").50
Apart from differences in the responsiveness of the indexes to their
component parts,51 the trading conditions underlying each index are
virtually identical. 5 2
Both TOPIX and Nikkei 225 stock index futures markets offerJapa-
nese investors trading opportunities for speculation, 53 risk-hedging,5 4
determine whether they might satisfy the reassignment rules to the First Section.
Concurrently, First-Section-assigned stock is transferred to the Second Section if it
falls within the purview of another set of reassignment rules. See TOPIX OUTLINE,
supra note 48, at 4 n.1.
TOPIX is a market-value-weighted index in that the market prices of each compo-
nent stock is multiplied by the number of shares listed. Accordingly, price changes in
a stock exert influence over the index in proportion to the stock's respective market
value, and stock price changes for large and widely-held companies give a heavier
impact on TOPIX than the same price change for smaller companies. See id. at 4-5.
50. See Markets Add Stock Index Futures, supra note 49, at 4, col. 1.
51. See id According to analysts and exchange officials, TOPIX is a more accurate
indicator of overall market trends, because, given its broader base, it is not as vulner-
able as the Nikkei 225 to volatility in the fluctuation of high-priced, small-capital
shares. Id.
52. For instance, the trading hours are the same-0900 to 1115, and 1300 to
1515 hours for weekdays and 0900 to 1115 on half-day holidays. The final settle-
ment date for these futures fall on the 10th of March, June, September and Decem-
ber. Both have a long trading term of fifteen months, with the last trading day prior
to the final settlement date falling on the third trading day prior to that settlement
date, and with the first day of trading as the business day immediately following the
last trading day. Settlement of open positions through counter-trading is permitted
between members only and where each open position of a member is marked to the
market by comparing the day's closing price with the previous day's closing price,
with the "variation margin" passing from the members whose positions lost value to
those whose positions gained value. This form of settlement can occur as early as the
third business day following the execution of orders. When settlement of an open
position occurs on the last trading day, an open position is marked against the clos-
ing index of the stock price index future. The margin requirements are the higher of
Y6 million, or 9 percent of the contract value, with three or more percent in cash.
The commission rates for transactions on both exchanges are .04 percent for con-
tracts valued at Y100 million or less; .03 percent plus Y10,000 for Y100 million to
Y300 million; .02 percent plus Y40,000 for Y300 million to Y500 million; .01 percent
plus Y90,000 for Y500 million to YI billion; and .005 percent plus Y140,000 for
more than YI billion. This commission is charged when a purchase or sale is made
and when a position is closed either by offsetting or delivery settlement methods. See
YAMAICHI SECURITIES Co., LTD., STOCK PRICE INDEX FUTURES, at 10-11 (1988) [here-
inafter YAMAICHI INVEsTMENT REPORT].
The only ostensible difference lies in the basic trading unit. TOPIX is bid or asked
in units of one point and traded in units 10,000 times the prevailing TSE stock price
index (a contract price of one unit of TOPIX covering 3000 points is Y30 million)
and where the Nikkei 225 is bid or asked in units of Y1O and traded in units 1,000
times the prevailing Nikkei stock price index (a contract price of unit of Nikkei stand-
ing at Y30,000 is Y30 million). Id.
53. Investors as speculators can profit from volatility in the stock-index futures
market itself by selling stock price index futures if they expect the equity market to
fall, or buying these futures if they expect the equity market to rise. Trading in stock-
index futures instead of the underlying stocks requires less investment, and as a
result, provides for increased leverage for taking profits or losses. See id. at 12.
54. Investors who wish to hedge stock holdings against risks arising from stock
market volatility, can, for instance, if they expect prices to fall, sell stock index
futures, using the profits of short-selling the futures to offset the capital losses in
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and arbitrage.5 5 To limit the market to sophisticated or wealthy traders,
TOPIX and Nikkei 225 have margin requirements similar to the OSF 50.
Both indexes require a minimum cash deposit of Y6 million or nine per-
cent of the transaction, whichever is higher.5 6 In addition, the stock
exchanges have established daily price limits to shield traders from suf-
fering inordinately large losses due to extreme volatility in underlying
stock prices.5 7 The daily limit is a range of three percent, plus or minus,
on the closing price or quotation of the preceding day.5 8 The stock
exchanges may narrow this band if abnormal market conditions develop
or threaten to develop in the futures markets. 5 9
While traders, including financial institutions and non-member
securities companies, may trade in these futures for their own accounts,
they must do so through TSE or OSE members, or non-members that
qualify to trade as special participants. 60 The commission paid may
vary, however, depending on whether the financial institution is a mem-
ber of the Japan Securities Dealers Association, a stock exchange mem-
ber, or a special participant. 6 '
holding the stocks if expectations are met. If prices are expected to rise, an investor
can use future anticipated cash receipts to enter the equity market by buying stock-
index contracts, and taking physical delivery of the underlying stock at a lower price.
Moreover, portfolio insurance as an asset allocation strategy designed to assure a
minimum return, can be achieved through stock-index futures. See id. at 12-14.
55. Arbitrageurs can exploit abnormal price differences between the cash and
futures markets, or between two fundamentally related futures contracts. For
instance, in the latter case, an investor may sell a TOPIX contract and buy a Nikkei
225, or vice versa. In addition, an investor can arbitrage between the Nikkei 225 and
its counterpart on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange ("SIMEX"). See
id at 15-26. For a discussion of the SIMEX Nikkei 225 and related markets, see infra
notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
56. See YAMAICHI INvEsTMENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 11.
57. See SECURITIES BOOKLET, supra note 38, at 7.
58. See YAMAICHI INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 11. The daily limit is
three percent of the upper price in each price bracket of the closing price quotation
on the preceding day. For instance, if the Nikkei 225 closed at Y37,000, where the
relevant price bracket is Y30,000 to Y40,000, the daily limit on the subsequent trad-
ing day is Y1,200 Id.
59. See SECURITIES BOOKLET, supra note 38, at 7. The stock exchange may also
inter alia restrict or prohibit trading in futures. and/or restrict contract writing. See id.
60. By Cabinet Order, the government may designate non-member domestic and
foreign securities companies to participate in an exchange, if they satisfy the require-
ments of each exchange. The TSE and OSE requirements for qualification are simi-
lar. The TSE, for example, requires an admission fee of 1,000,000 yen; the OSE,
600,000 yen. The TSE requires a non-interest bearing special deposit of 50 million
yen; the OSE, 60 million yen. See OSAKA SECURITIES EXCHANGE, CONTRACT SPECIFI-
CATIONS OF FUTURES TRADING SYSTEM BASED ON THE NIKKEI STOCK AVERAGE, at 12-13
(1988) [hereinafter "OSE BOOKLET"] and TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, TOPIX
FUTURES, CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE FUTURES CONTRACT BASED ON THE
TOKYO STOCK PRICE INDEX 10-11 (1988).
61. For instance, regular members, special participants, and non-members of the
stock exchange who are members of the Japan Securities Dealers Association qualify
for a special rate that amounts to fifty percent of what non-special rate securities
firms would pay. See, e.g., OSE BOOKLET, supra note 60, at 9-10.
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Although both indexes share many features with the OSF 50, they
possess additional advantages that lead observers to predict an early
demise for the path-breaking OSF 50.62 First, TOPIX and Nikkei 225
futures traders do not have to contend with physical delivery of stock
certificates. The enabling amendment to the Securities and Exchange
Law6 3 legalized cash settlement in all cases. 64 Second, although the
MoF initially planned to levy the same transactions tax on the index
futures markets as it had imposed on the OSF 50, that is 0.0125 per-
cent,6 5 it postponed implementing any tax on the index futures markets
until April 1989.66
On the other hand, the otherwise cumbersome physical delivery set-
tlement method underlying OSF 50 futures contract ultimately may be
its only saving grace, since this method allows investors to acquire stocks
at a lower cost than in the cash market. 67
4. Other Futures
In addition to futures markets for bonds, stocks, and stock indexes, the
MoF will soon approve futures markets on a variety of other instru-
ments. For example, pursuant to Diet's passage of the Financial Futures
Trading Law enacted on May 25, 1988, the MoF will permit an interest
rate and currency futures market to operate beginning in 1989.68 The
Federation of Bankers Associations ofJapan ("Zenginkyo") will launch
the exchange,6 9 providing an interest rate futures market 70 in Euroyen
62. See Kamada, Osaka Stock Futures 50 Faces Early Decline, Japan Econ. J., Aug. 27,
1988, at 3, col. 5 [hereinafter Early Decline].
63. Amended SEL, supra note 3.
64. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The difference is not significant,
however, because an open position on an OSF 50 contract is usually settled through
a counter-trading or offsetting position before the final settlement date, obviating the
need for physical delivery of the stock certificates.
65. See Takahashi, Tokyo, Osaka Vie for Crown As Stock Index Futures King, Japan
Econ. J., June 18, 1988, at 1, col. 2 [hereinafter Vie for Crown].
66. See YAMAICHI INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 11.
67. See Early Decline, supra note 62, at 3, col. 5.
68. See Kinyu-Sakimono-Rotihiki Ho (Financial Futures Trading Law), Law No.
77 of 1988.
69. See Vie for Crown, supra note 65, at 2, col. 2.
70. An interest rate futures market affords investors the opportunity to hedge
bond portfolios against interest rate volatility. For instance, an investor with a port-
folio of long-term bonds who anticipates that interest rates will rise may sell interest
rate futures contracts in order to protect the portfolio against decreases in bond val-
ues should interest rates rise, (Of course, the investor will forsake any increase in
bond value should interest rates fall.) The selling of these futures is particularly
desirable if the investor wants to stabilize the effective return on these bonds (capital
gains and losses plus interest) especially if they were to be sold. In addition, an
investor with short-term bonds, who anticipates that interest rates will fall, increasing
the value of the portfolio but not as much as if the portfolio consisted of long-term
bonds, may purchase interest rate contracts, instead of long term bonds. Through
this strategy, the investor would close the open long futures position while the short-
term bonds matured, using the proceeds from the disposition thereof to acquire long
term bonds. See B. LONGSTRETH, supra note 5, at 135.
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and Eurodollars, 7 1 interest rate contracts, and a currency futures market
in yen contracts. 72 The Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate ("TIBOR") will
serve as the standard rate of settlement for Euroyen and Eurodollar
deposits, in part, to avoid competition with LIBOR, the settlement stan-
dard used in the London, Chicago, Singapore, and other foreign finan-
cial markets. 73 Zenginkyo announced that it would locate the first
financial futures exchange in Tokyo.7 4 The exchange will open in
March 1989, with trading of Eurodollar and Euroyen interest rate con-
tracts and yen currency futures beginning in June 1989. 7 5
Zenginkyo has also begun investigating the possible opening of a
second financial futures market in Osaka. 76 Zenginkyo would probably
have to clearly differentiate any Osaka market from the Tokyo market to
overcome Osaka's relative disadvantages, including the presence in
71. A Eurocurrency is a currency held on deposit by corporations and national
governments in a country other than the one that issued the currency. As a result, a
Euroyen is a yen deposit retained outside Japan, and a Eurodollar, a dollar deposit
outside the United States. Although the prefix "Euro" historically denoted a cur-
rency held on deposit in a European country outside the country of issue, a Eurocur-
rency now is one that is held in any country outside the one that issued the currency.
72. Although currency futures contracts in yen have traded elsewhere, including
the CME, no currency futures markets have existed in Japan. Currency futures serve
to hedge against exchange rate volatility. For instance, an American subsidiary in
Japan that brings goods from its American-based parent and resells them in Japan for
yen, will wish to repatriate dollars to its parent. The subsidiary will purchase yen
currency futures if it expects the yen to fall, locking in the value of its yen proceeds
into U.S. dollars, to return the expected dollar proceeds to its parent.
73. Tokyo Futures to Use TIBOR Standard, Japan Econ.J., Dec. 26, 1987, at 10, col.
1.
74. See Osaka Due Financial Futures ExchangeJapan Econ.J.,July 16, 1988, at 3, col.
3 [hereinafter Osaka Due Exchange].
75. Id.
76. See Osaka Due Exchange, supra note 74, at 3, col. 3. The Zenginkyo decision was
in response to a concerted effort by the Kansai Economic Federation (which repre-
sents the Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe region) to have Osaka represent the first financial
futures market, citing among other advantages that lower land acquisition costs for a
building to house the market, and its expertise in OSF 50 futures tradiing. See Vie for
Crown, supra note 65 at 2, col. 2. The Osaka-Tokyo rivalry is not new. Osaka had
been Japan's commercial capital since ancient times, first becoming prominent as the
port city for Kyoto, Japan's feudal capital. Between 1955 and 1984, however, Osaka
prefecture's share ofJapan's industrial output fell from 12.6% to 8.4%, with its share
of the country's total exports falling from 52.6% to 20.5%o. See Kansai: Second Wind or
Second Best?, EcoNoMisT, June 20, 1987, at 76-77. Against this backdrop of Osaka's
reduced economic importance relative to the entire country, Osaka has tried to
equal, and even upstage Tokyo as a financial center. Currently, Osaka accounts for
11 percent and 13 percent of bank lending and share trading in Japan, as opposed to
Tokyo's share of 75-80 percent in these categories. See id. By comparison, Osaka's
prewar share was forty percent. Id. Despite this gap, the OSE is the world's third
biggest stock market, after Tokyo and New York in terms of the capitalization of the
listed companies. A Yen to Grow, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24,, 1987, at 71-72. To capture a
greater market share of financial services from Tokyo, the OSE adopted a niche strat-
egy, which has thus far included the creation of a market to encourage flotations of
small and medium sized firms in 1984, the earlier opening of its exchange in 1985,
the introduction of the OSF 50 and the Nikkei 225 in 1987 and 1988, respectively.
See id.
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Tokyo of a majority of the institutional investors77 and Osaka's absence
of foreign banks. 78
5. Options Trading
The MoF has also deregulated some forms of options trading inJapan.79
It has done so by countenancing unofficial options trading in currency
and trading in an option-like transactions market in government bonds
prior to establishing officially sanctioned options markets.
Banks and foreign exchange brokers have conducted unofficial pri-
vate trading in currency options for a number of years.80 Currency
options allow major trading companies and corporations with significant
overseas transactions to hedge against foreign exchange risks.8 1 In
March, 1988, the Bank of Japan began collecting data from the various
banks and other financial institutions that comprise this market as a prel-
ude to providing official approval of currency options trading.82
De facto options trading in Japanese government bonds began in
1987. At that time, Japanese and American securities companies began
to offer institutional investors the opportunity to enter into forward
transactions of the bonds with a right of cancellation.8 3 These contracts
are analogous to options; the right of cancellation permits the holder to
abrogate his obligation to buy or sell Japanese government bonds
before a future settlement date.
Current plans indicate that official trading of options will begin in
early 1989. After receiving authorization from the MoF, 84 the OSE
announced plans to initiate options trading of the Nikkei 225 in 1989.85
77. See Vie for Crown, supra note 65. Investors usually use securities as payment for
margin calls, making physical delivery in Osaka inconvenient. Id.
78. Id.
79. An option is the right to buy or sell a financial instrument within a certain
period. Call options (rights to buy) can be written (sold) against specific financial
instruments held in a portfolio. Conversely, put options (rights to sell) can be writ-
ten (sold) against portfolio cash. For a price, the call option writer agrees to sell a
financial instrument at a fixed price, an exercise price. If the value of the instrument
rises above the exercise price, the writer has the instrument called away, losing the
increase in the value of the instrument, which is offset by the premium. On the other
hand, if the value falls below the exercise price, the option lapses, and the call writer
retains the option price. See LONOSTRETH, supra note 5, at 137.
80. BOJ Investigating Currency Options in Tokyo, Japan Econ. J., Apr. 9, 1988, at 15,
col. I [hereinafter BOJ Investigation].
81. Currency Options Trading Increases Sharply in Tokyo,Japan Econ.J., Apr. 23, 1988,
at 12, col. 3.
82. BOJ Investigation, supra note 80.
83. Option Trading Starts on Japan Government Bonds, Japan Econ.J.,Jan. 16, 1988, at
20, col. 5.
84. Ministry Will Approve Stock-Option Dealing, Japan Econ. J., Aug. 30, 1986, at 19,
col. 2 [hereinafter Ministry Approves]. But it was not until May 1988 that the Diet
amended the SEL to allow companies to engage in stock option trading. See
Amended SEL, supra note 3.
85. OSE To Introduce Nikkei Option Trading, Japan Econ.J., Dec. 12, 1987, at 19, col.
2. The May 1988 Amendments to the SEL also removed restrictions on options trad-
ing. See Amended SEL, supra note 3. In January, 1988, the OSE issued a report on a
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Moreover, recent government pronouncements suggest that the OSE's
Nikkei options trading may not be the first options market in Japan. In
June 1988 the MoF announced that it will promptly sanction over-the-
counter options trading on government bonds.8 6 The advanced sched-
ule reflects in part the MoF's concern that domestic financial institutions
are several years behind foreign competitors in this trading activity.8 7
C. Offerings of Japanese Derivative Financial Products Overseas
Spring 1988 witnessed the debut of three privately issued but officially
sanctioned Japanese derivative financial products in overseas markets.
In April, the MoF permitted Japanese securities companies to trade Jap-
anese government bond warrants8 8 in overseas markets.8 9 In May, the
MoF further authorized over-the-counter trading of bond futures war-
rants on overseas markets9o and sales of stock index warrants on the
Euromarkets. 9 1 All three products offer valuable opportunities for
holders of Japanese stocks and bonds to hedge investment risk.
The approval of the market in government bond warrants created
the first option-like instrument, domestic or overseas, issued on a Japa-
nese government bond.9 2 Not coincidentally, the MoF cautiously lim-
ited sales of the instrument for fear that full scale marketing would
unfavorably influence the underlying cash markets in Tokyo.9 3 Observ-
ers have commented that the MoF may have authorized sales of the
bond warrants for a reason other than investor diversification-namely,
to forestall large-scale unofficial trading in government bond futures on
U.S. version of the trading system which the exchange will use as a bench-mark for
drafting its rules. See Ministry Approves, supra note 84, at 19, col. 2. The MoF had
countenanced as early as 1986 the prospect of creating markets in securities options,
starting with a market for stock index options. The report recommended a minimum
trading unit of Y500, and delivery dates of the 10th of March, June, September and
December. See OSE Issues Report on Options TradingJapan Econ.J.,Jan. 23, 1988, at 2,
col. 3.
86. MoF Said to Back Options Trading, Japan Econ. J., June 18, 1988, at 13, col. 3.
87. Id.
88. A warrant, usually issued as a detachable portion of a bond, enables the
holder to buy an underlying security at a set price within a specified period.
89. MoF Permits Sales of Government Bond Warrants, Japan Econ.J., May 7, 1988, at
13, col. 1 [hereinafter MoF Permits Sales]. See also infra notes 92-94 and accompanying
text.
90. Japan to Decontrol Stock Index Warrants, Japan Econ. J., June 11, 1988, at 13, col.
1 [hereinafter Decontrol Index Warrants]. See also infra notes 95-97 and accompanying
text.
91. Decontrol Index Warrants, supra note 90, at 13, col. 1. See also infra notes 98-100.
92. Rubinfien & Sesit, Daiwa, Salomon Units to Offer in Europe An Option-Like Security
on Japan Bonds, Wall St.J., Feb. 23, 1988. at 45, col. I [hereinafter Rubinfien & Sesit].
In substance, these warrants are options on Japanese bonds.
93. See MoF Permits Sales, supra note 89, at 13, col. 1. The MoF granted permission
only to London-based units of Daiwa Securities Co. and Salomon Brothers, Inc. to
start limited sales in March 1988. See Rubinfien & Sesit, supra note 92, at 45, col. 1.
In addition, the MoF limited the number of options issued to no more than ten per-
cent of the outstanding balance of government bonds in the secondary market in
Tokyo. See MoF Permits Sales, supra note 89, at 13, col. 1.
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the London financial markets by the Bank of Tokyo.9 4
The over-the-counter trading of government bond futures warrants
has proven hugely successful, attaining a volume of Y525 billion within
a month of the initial issuance of the warrants. 95 This success rests
largely on the opportunities the bond futures warrants provide overseas
investors for avoiding risks of price volatility in the large market for Jap-
anese bond futures.96 Market innovation has led Japanese securities
firms' offshore units to offer these warrants with multiple exercise prices
to meet investors' risk diversification needs. 9 7
The stock index warrants allow holders to buy and sell options tied
to the Nikkei 225.98 This constitutes a valuable risk hedging device for
offshore holders of Japanese stocks that wish to hedge their stock port-
folios against possible falls in share prices.9 9 However, the MoF
attaches an important limitation to the stock index warrants in that it
prohibits sales to Japanese residents. 10 0
H. Analysis
As the foregoing section illustrates, Japanese investors have gained
access to an extensive list of derivative financial products, both at home
and abroad. Concurrently, foreign investors in yen denominated mar-
kets have gained several new methods of hedging investment risk. This
Section will assess the development of Japanese derivative financial
products markets, including probable areas of additional liberalization,
and discuss an important, likely consequence of the Japanese move
towards deregulation-the globalization of cash and derivative financial
products markets.
A. Extent of Liberalization of Japanese Derivative Financial
Products Markets
Japan has undergone an extraordinary change in financial markets, from
having access to no derivative products in 1985 to having by the end of
1990 an array of derivative products markets in 10 and 20 year govern-
ment bond futures; 10 1 the OSF 50 stock futures market;' 0 2 two stock
index futures markets;10 3 interest rates futures in Euroyen and Eurodol-
94. Japanese Government Bond Option Traded in London, Japan Econ.J.,Jan. 30, 1988,
at 21, col. 1. The Bank of Tokyo's action led other financial institutions to consider
options trading on Japanese bond futures listed on the London International Finan-
cial Futures Exchange ("LIFFE"). Id.
95. Government Bond Futures Warrants Hit Y525 Billion Abroad, Japan Econ. J., July
16, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
96. See id.
97. Multiple Price Warrants Offered, Japan Econ.J., Sept. 10, 1988, at 17, col. 1.
98. Decontrol Index Warrants, supra note 90, at 13, col. 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
Cornell International Law Journal
lars; 10 4 currency futures in yen contracts; 10 5 currency options;10 6
options-like forward transactions in government bonds with a right of
cancellation;10 7 stock index options based on the Nikkei 225;108 and
over the counter options trading in Japanese government bonds. 10 9
These markets do not include, of course, the access Japanese investors
have to a full range of overseas derivative financial products markets. 110
Given this rapid change, further liberalization measures will almost
certainly continue, especially once performance of the markets allay
fears of harm to investors. Expansion will have to occur on two fronts.
First, the MoF can lower the onerous participation requirements that
presently prevent small investors from using the market. 1 '1 Second, the
MoF can authorize additional forms of derivative financial markets.
One important likely development is the creation of a unified Japa-
nese financial futures market. The Zenginkyo has pushed for such a
market since early 1987112 and the MoF has responded enthusiastically
to promote the globalization of Japanese financial markets."13 In
104. See supra notes 68-71, 73-75 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 68-69, 72-75 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 84-85 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 10-22, 88-100 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 20-22, 39-41, 56 and accompanying text.
112. Banks Push for Unified Financial Futures Market, Japan Econ. J., March 7, 1987, at
1. A working group of Zenginkyo, led by Japan's six major city banks, created a
framework for an integrated financial futures market. The financial instruments were
to include yen exchange rate futures, similar to those traded overseas, such as on the
CME, to hedge against foreign exchange risk; short-term interest rate futures mar-
kets, with certificates of deposit on the appropriate short-term financial instrument;
and interest rate futures for 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds and three-month Eurodol-
lar-deposits. Id. The group placed priority on the introduction of yen currency
futures contracts, with direct participation limited to banks, the only financial institu-
tions empowered to have foreign exchange dealings by Article 11 of Gaikoku-Kawase
yobi Gai Koku-B6eki kanri-h6 (Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law),
Law No. 228 of 1949, and the amendment thereto, Gaikoku-Kawase oyobi Gaikoku-
B6eld Kanri-H6 no Ichibu o Kasei suru Hortisu (Law to Amend a Part of the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law), Law No. 65 of 1979. See id.
113. The MoF responded to the Zenginkyo initiative by asking an advisory body,
The Financial System Research Council Committee ("FSRCC"), to prepare measures
to provide for drafting of new laws concerning financial futures trading and initiating
futures trading exchanges. See Ministry to Set Up Domestic Trading in Financial Futures,
Japan Econ.J., May 9, 1987, at 1, col. 1. Another MoF advisory body, the Securities
& Exchange Council Committee ("SECC"), promulgated a competing report in April
1987 that recommended that securities futures be traded on the TSE, that direct
participation be limited to securities and that the administration of securities-related
futures remain regulated by the existing Securities & Exchange Law. See Securities
Firms Fight, supra note 48, at 3, col. 1. Zenginkyo later withdrew domestic securities
from its proposal in order to strike a modus vivendi with the securities industry. See
Banks Move Toward Integrated Futures Markets, Japan Econ. J., Oct. 24, 1987, at 12, col.
1.
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November, 1987, two MoF advisory bodies 14 released a joint proposal
recommending the creation of an integrated financial futures market. 115
The proposal struck a careful compromise between the competing inter-
ests of Japanese banks and securities companies. Both will be able to
trade futures in interest rates, currencies, and domestic government
bond futures.1 16 Moreover, both are entitled to act as brokers of for-
eign futures and options to Japanese customers,1 17 except that banks
will handle foreign stock indexes1 18 and securities companies will have
sole authority over foreign spot currency options.1 19 Finally, the propo-
sal would allow banks to act as brokers for domestic and, perhaps, for-
eign government bonds, a power already held by securities
companies. 120
The unified market proposal would empower foreign financial insti-
tutions to engage in all of the above listed financial futures products. 12 1
This parallels previous decisions by the MoF in which it has granted
greater power to foreign firms than their domestic counterparts. 12 2
114. These bodies are the FSRCC discussed supra note 113, and the Foreign
Exchange Council Committee, an advisory body to the MoF's International Finance
Bureau.
115. See THE FINANCIAL SYsTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL [COMMITTEE] AND THE FOREIGN
EXCHANGE AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS [COUNCIL] COMMITTEE, ON THE ORDERLY
ADJUSTMENT OF TRADING IN FINANCIAL FUTURES AND OPTIONS (Nov. 26, 1987). The
proposal recommended the creation of an integrated financial futures market, a pro-
posal that favored the Zenginkyo initiatives, and, in response to the securities indus-
try's proposals, the trading of securities-related futures on the existing stock
exchanges subject to an amended Securities and Exchange Law. See Futures: A Ques-
tion of Tui] Japan Econ.J., Dec. 12, 1987, at 26, col. 1.
116. See New Futures Market will Open For Banks, Securities Companies, Japan Econ. J.,
Jan. 23, 1988, at 2, col 4 [hereinafter New Futures Market].
117. Id.
118. Whitener, The Steady Erosion of Japan's Glass-Steagall, INT'L FIN. L. REV. (May
1988).
119. Id.
120. See Securities Firms Fight, supra note 48, at 3, col. 1. The division of responsibili-
ties between Japanese banks and securities firms set forth in this Section is designed
to maintain some aspects of Article 65 of the SEL, supra note 2, the Japanese
equivalent of the American Glass-Steagall Act, Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat.
162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1982)) (separating com-
mercial from investment banking). See generally Whitener, supra note 118. This
involvement of commercial banks in brokerage services or government bonds repre-
sents a major setback for the securities industry, which hitherto had a monopoly on
domestic government bond brokerage services. Id. This will cause securities firms to
lose much of these revenues, and perhaps even more damaging, securities firms will
lose additional business to banks which conduct the lion's share of government bond
trading. See id. Banks have dominated the total volume of government bond futures;
for example, in August, 1988, banks conducted 62.9% of all transactions. See Banks
Dominate August Bond Futures Trading, Japan Econ. J., Sept. 24, 1988, at 29, col. 3.
121. See Whitener, supra note 118.
122. For instance, foreign commercial banks with trust departments were allowed
to engage in the trust banking in Japan, where there was a separation of domestic
commercial and trust banking banks. In addition, the government allowed foreign
securities affiliates of foreign commercial banks and foreign universal banks to apply
forJapanese securities licenses and, in some cases, obtain seats on the TSE, whereas
Cornell International Law Journal
B. Incipient Globalization of Cash and Derivative Financial Products
Markets
The 1980s have witnessed the beginnings of a global market for cash
and derivative financial products. Full globalization will require the sat-
isfaction of two general conditions. First, financial institutions in one
country must have access to the cash and derivative financial products
markets of other countries. The deregulation ofJapanese financial insti-
tutions at home and abroad is an important step towards meeting the
first condition. Second, countries must take measures that help broaden
and deepen their markets for the cash and derivative financial product
markets of other countries. While still in its infancy, this latter condition
is beginning to be satisfied.
Several countries have begun cross-listing Japanese financial prod-
ucts. In 1986, the Singapore International Monetary Exchange
("SIMEX") took a major step by offering futures trading on the Nikkei
225, two years before the TSE and the OSE initiated stocks index
futures trade inJapan.123
Although the SIMEX Nikkei 225 market originally was plagued by
illiquidity124 and lost most of its potential client base after the TSE and
OSE introduced stock index futures trading, 125 it will likely become a
viable and growing satellite of these largerJapanese stock index futures
markets.' 2 6 First, SIMEX has lower transactions costs than the two Jap-
anese stock futures markets due to lower commission rates and no
exchange tax. 127 Second, the SIMEX Nikkei futures contract trades con-
tinuously without lunch breaks, and remains open for fifteen minutes
after the Japanese markets close, providing for better price determina-
tions.1 28 Third, the SIMEX hopes to list options on the Nikkei 225
futures contract by the end of 1988.129 Fourth, the SIMEX plans to
cross-list the futures contract with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
("CME") when that important U.S. market begins carrying the Nikkei by
the end of 1988.130 Finally, the SIMEX is a broader market, with trad-
domestic commercial banks were not permitted to engage in the securities activities
of the securities industry. See id.
123. A Future, supra note 19, at 73.
124. See Leung, Trading or Stock-Index Futures in Osaka Will Help Modernize Japanese
Markets, Asian Wall St.J. Weekly, May 11, 1987, at 19, col. 1. Independent and local
traders dominated the SIMEX market. Because they did not have the extensive cus-
tomer lists and capitalization possessed by Japanese securities firms, institutional
investors avoided the market for fear that they would not be able to liquidate a posi-
tion, if needed. See id.
125. See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
126. Schoenfeld, SIMEX Trader Sees Boon From Japan Entry, Japan Econ. J., July 9,
1988, at 7, col. 1 [hereinafter SIMEX Trader Sees Boon].
127. See id. On September 1, 1988, the SIMEX lowered its minimum commission
rates for Nikkei index futures by up to 72%, a feature which should make its commis-
sion more competitive in large lot transactions. See Ngor, SIMEX Monitors Start of
Japan Trade, Japan Econ.J., Sept. 10, 1988, at 6, col. 1 [hereinafter SIMEX Monitors].
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ing in other types of futures, and with more to be added,1 31 providing a
more diversified customer base. 132
Given these differences between the SIMEX and the Japanese stock-
index futures and the differences in the Japanese stock-index futures
inter se, arbitrage opportunities between the SIMEX and the Japanese
markets will occur as arbitrageurs look for price variations in the differ-
ent markets to exploit and make a profit.13 3 This and other inter-market
activity will increase liquidity for all products and make these markets
more efficient with prices being determined by more buyers and sell-
ers. 13 4 Of course, the small-lot trading of small, non-Japanese institu-
tions will dominate the SIMEX whereas the large-lot trading ofJapanese
institutional investors will continue to dominate the Japanese
markets.13 5
American and British exchanges and institutions are also joining the
cross-listing effort. As discussed above, 13 6 the CME hopes to trade Nik-
kei 225 futures contracts by the end of 1988137 but, pursuant to an
agreement between the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") and the CFTC, the SEC may check and veto stock futures
instruments to ensure sound transactions. 13 8 In addition, the CBT, the
CME's rival, plans to list the TSE's TOPIX index in 1989.13 9
In July 1987, the LIFFE became the first exchange outside Japan to
offer Japanese government bond futures contracts, having received the
MoF's approval in December 1986.140 The LIFFE's futures contract is
similar to that of the TSE in that traders cannot settle London contracts
by physical delivery of the underlying bonds, but must settle in cash
based on the closing price of the contract in Tokyo. 14 1 The CBT ini-
tially planned to launch a yen bond contract identical to and inter-
changeable with that of LIFFE, 142 but perceived problems with rules
131. Id The SIMEX plans to open a fuel oil futures contract, revive its gold
futures contract, and provide an index future for the Singapore stock exchange. Id.
132. Id.
133. See SIMEX Monitors, supra note 127, at 6, col. 1.
134. See SIMEX Trader Sees Boon, supra note 126, at 7, col. 1.
135. See SIMEX Monitors, supra note 127, at 6, col. 1.
136. See text accompanying supra note 130.
137. In August, 1986, the CME filed an application with the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC") to list the Nikkei 225. See Chicago Exchange First into
Tokyo to Ready for Futures Deregulation,Japan Econ.J., May 2, 1987, at 3, col. 4. Unfor-
tunately, delayed regulatory approval by the SEC and the CFTC caused the CME to
defer listing the Nikkei 225, probably to the end of 1988. SEC Supports Nikkei on Chi-
cago Exchange, Japan Econ.J., Apr. 30, 1988, at 19, col. 2.
138. Id.
139. Financial Futures Trading Gets Green Light from Diet, Japan Econ.J.,June 4, 1988,
at 3, col. 1.
140. Japan Bond Futures Set for LIFFE Trading in July, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, June
1, 1987, at 28, col. 1.
141. Futures Trading in London-Turning Japanese, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1987, at 80.
142. See Nicoll,Japanese Bonds Make First-Day Splash in London, FIN. TIMES, July 14,
1987, at 1, col. 6.
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regulating the LIFFE contract. 14 3 For example, the CBT wants to halve
the size of the Tokyo and London contracts 144 to attract smaller inves-
tors and increase liquidity, and wants futures contracts closed in Chi-
cago settled in Tokyo with the actual delivery of bonds. 14 5
In Japan, the TSE plans to list U.S. Treasury bond futures in 1989, a
move which will enable Japanese investors to hedge against price volatil-
ity in the underlying United States government bonds, which are traded
in increasing volumes on the over-the-counter market in Tokyo. 146 It
remains uncertain when and to what extent other foreign derivative
financial products will be traded in Japan. The development of these
markets will in large part depend on the growth in Japan of cash markets
for the underlying foreign financial instruments.
Conclusion
Once prohibited as speculative and risky, derivative financial products
and corresponding markets are emerging quickly in Japan, broadening
and deepening the existing financial markets for the underlying cash
instruments. While currently incomplete, this program of liberalization
remains necessary to permit investors, institutional or otherwise, to
hedge against the volatility inherent in the underlying markets. Only
time will determine whether the regulations that made available deriva-
tive financial products markets to Japanese investors abroad and at
home will be judged a success. Nevertheless, this liberalization process
will almost certainly speed the day in which firms will operate within a
truly integrated international market for financial products.
143. See Death at LIFFE, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1987, at 77.
144. Id. The Tokyo and London markets require contracts of Y100 million. See id.
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